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Non-Technical Summary
Many countries display a substantial degree of taxing autonomy for local ju-
risdictions while at the same time being characterized by some redistributive
grant systems which tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax
competition. While the existence of redistributive grant systems may ex-
plain why local governments in those countries make use of distortive taxes
despite of tax competition, it is difficult to derive policy recommendations.
The reason is that the welfare implications from tax competition and tax
coordination strongly depend on the government objectives.
Given this background the current paper explores the conditions under
which redistributive grant systems will or will not achieve or raise efficiency
in local finances. We consider a standard model of tax competition of local
jurisdictions and introduce a system of redistributive grants executed at the
state level. The basic model is then extended in order to allow for variations in
the government objectives at the state level. The theoretical results suggest
that attempts of upper level governments to extract fiscal resources from
the local revenue sharing system will tend to undermine efficiency of local
finances, and, possibly, even result in excessive equalization.
The implications from our theoretical analysis are finally contrasted with
the experience in Germany. Germany is a particularly interesting case to
study in this respect as it combines municipal tax autonomy and substantial
revenue sharing among municipalities supervised and enforced by the states
(La¨nder). At the same time, some of the German states are in an increasingly
difficult fiscal situation where the debt burden is rather high such that they
may be tempted to induce local jurisdictions to increase taxing effort.
Moreover, also the German system of fiscal federalism provides several
incentives and disincentives for government policies at the state level which
allows us to investigate whether, in fact, the response of state governments
to changes in the policy constraints, say a reduction in the grants received
at the level of states, includes an adjustment of the revenue sharing system
among municipalities.
Our empirical analysis of tax policy in Germany suggests that attempts
of state governments to extract fiscal resources from the municipal revenue
sharing system exert an upward pressure on tax rates. This raises doubts
whether the state government should really be considered as pursuing poli-
cies only in the interest of municipalities. The results of the paper support
concerns that the potential benefits from local revenue sharing cannot be
reaped if the state, as the institution enforcing the revenue sharing system
at the local level, pursues own policies and operates under conditions which
cause inefficiencies at the state level.
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1 Introduction
Many countries display a substantial degree of taxing autonomy for local
jurisdictions not only with regard to the taxation of land or property but
also with regard to income taxation. As emphasized in the tax competition
literature this may lead to inefficiently low taxes due to the existence of fiscal
externalities of local tax policy decisions (e.g., Wilson, 1999). However, many
countries with a decentralized public sector also display some redistributive
grant systems which tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax
competition (Bucovetsky and Smart, 2002, Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2002).
While the existence of redistributive grant systems may explain why lo-
cal governments in those countries make use of distortive taxes despite of
tax competition (Smart, 1998, Dahlby, 2002), the welfare implications from
tax competition and tax coordination strongly depend on the government
objectives. In fact, as noted by Wildasin and Wilson (2004) the standard
view that tax competition reduces welfare is probably most challenged by
Leviathan models, where governments pursue objectives other than maxi-
mizing the utility of residents.
Given this background the current paper explores the conditions under
which redistributive grant systems will or will not achieve or raise efficiency
in local finances. More specifically, we consider a standard model of tax
competition between local jurisdictions and follow Bucovetsky and Smart
(2002) by introducing a system of redistributive grants enforced by the state
level which under certain assumptions restores efficiency. This setting is then
extended by introducing additional government objectives at the state level,
such that the state government is not solely interested in the efficiency of local
finances but also aims at pursuing own policies under its specific constraints.
The extensions enable us to derive some testable hypotheses and predictions
under which conditions the potentially beneficial state intervention into local
finances introduces new distortions at the local level. It turns out that if
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the state government wants to raise expenditures related to own policies
and cannot further reduce unconditional grants to local jurisdictions, it may
use its influence on the local tax policy in order to raise local tax revenue,
which, in turn, is transferred to the state budget by means of higher local
jurisdictions’ revenue sharing contributions.
The theoretical implications are finally contrasted with the experience in
Germany. Germany is a particularly interesting case to study in this re-
spect as it combines municipal tax autonomy and substantial revenue sharing
among municipalities supervised and enforced by the states (La¨nder). Pre-
vious research also indicates that the revenue sharing among municipalities
does in fact exert a strong impact on the jurisdictions’ tax policy (Buettner,
2005). At the same time, some of the German states are in an increasingly
difficult fiscal situation where the debt burden is rather high such that they
may be tempted to induce local jurisdictions to increase taxing effort. More-
over, also the German system of fiscal federalism provides several incentives
and disincentives for government policies at the state level which can be used
to identify the constraints under which the states operate. This will allow us
to investigate whether, in fact, the response of state governments to changes
in the policy constraints, say a reduction in the grants received at the level
of states, includes an adjustment of the revenue sharing system among mu-
nicipalities.
Since it is very difficult to compare the complex local revenue sharing sys-
tems across German states, our analysis considers the empirical implications
for the local tax policy and test whether conditions faced by state policy
makers are reflected in the tax policy pursued at the local level. The results
indicate that, controlling for differences in the tax base, the local tax rate
does respond to some significant degree and in the way suggested by the
theory to the fiscal conditions at the state level. This supports the concern
that the potential benefits from local revenue sharing cannot be obtained if
the state as the institution enforcing the revenue sharing system pursues own
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objectives.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section contains the the-
oretical analysis which derives empirical implications with regard to local
jurisdictions’ tax policy. Section three, then, provides an empirical analysis
of tax policy in Germany. The last section provides the conclusions.
2 Theoretical Analysis
This section formally explores the conditions under which a redistributive
grant system enforced by the state can be expected to restore efficiency in
a situation of tax competition, and, under which circumstances the grant
system will introduce additional inefficiencies. A first subsection lays out
a standard model of tax competition, before the second subsection defines
an optimal grant system designed to raise the efficiency of the local public
sector, which is closely related to Bucovetsky and Smart (2002). A third
subsection, then, introduces the possibility of additional state government
objectives beyond simply ensuring efficient local finances. Finally, the fourth
subsection analyzes the impact of redistributive grant systems at the state
level.
2.1 Tax Competition
We consider a set of n local jurisdictions, labelled i = 1, ..., n, which are
situated in the same state. In each of them, a competitive firm produces
the same homogenous private good by means of two factors, one of which
is mobile, say capital, the other immobile, say labor. Denoting by ki the
amount of capital employed in jurisdiction i per unit of labor, the per capita
production function f(ki) is assumed to be identical across jurisdictions with
f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0. Local jurisdictions levy a source based tax on capital
at a rate of τi units per unit of capital installed in jurisdiction i. Profit
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maximization by local firms and free mobility of capital imply that the net
rate of return to capital r is equal across jurisdictions and given by the after
tax marginal product of capital:
r = f ′ (ki)− τi.
As a consequence, capital demand (per-capita) at location i is determined by
a function
ki = φ (r + τi) .
From the profit maximization condition, note that we have
∂ki
∂r
=
∂ki
∂τi
=
1
f ′′(ki)
< 0.
Thus, both a higher net interest rate and a higher local tax rate reduce the
demand for capital in jurisdiction i.
Residents of jurisdiction i derive utility ui from private (ci) and public (zi)
consumption per capita in their home jurisdiction according to a quasi-linear
utility function
ui = ci + αiv (zi)
where v is an increasing and strictly concave function. The parameter αi > 0
measures the intensity of preferences for the public good in jurisdiction i and
may vary across jurisdictions. Private consumption per-capita is given by
ci = f (ki)− kif ′ (ki) + sir
= f (ki)− ki (r + τi) + sir,
where si is the capital endowment of residents in jurisdiction i per-capita.
Public consumption is determined by the budget constraint of the local gov-
ernment
zi = τiki + gi,
where gi is revenue from grants.
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Suppose that the total net supply of capital to the state is a positive
function s(r) of the net rate of return. Then, the capital market equilibrium
is given by where gi is revenue from grants.∑
i
ki =
∑
i
si + s (r) .
Implicit differentiation of this condition yields
∂r
∂τi
= −
∂ki
∂τi∑
j
∂kj
∂r − ∂s∂r
.
Notice that from ∂ki/∂τi = ∂ki/∂r < 0 and ∂s/∂r > 0, it follows that
−1 < ∂r/∂τi < 0.
We assume that the local jurisdictions choose their tax rates simultane-
ously such that each jurisdiction takes the tax rates of the other jurisdictions
as given and neglects the impact of its tax policy on the other jurisdictions.
Private consumption ci is a function of the local capital stock ki and the net
interest rate r which in turn are determined by the local tax rates. In the
absence of grants, the same is true for local public good supply zi. The utility
of the residents of jurisdiction i can thus be written as a function of the tax
rate set by this jurisdiction, ui(τi). The first-order condition for maximization
from the perspective of the local government is
∂ui (τi)
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂zi
(
ki + τi(
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
!
= 0. (1)
As a benchmark, let us now consider a situation where the state govern-
ment directly chooses the local tax rates τi and the levels of the local public
good zi. Assume that the state government aims at maximizing the sum of
utilities
V 1 ≡
∑
j
u1j =
∑
j
(
f (kj)− kj (r + τj) + sjr + αjv(zj)
)
,
subject to the overall budget constraint∑
j
zj =
∑
j
τjkj .
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With the Lagrangian
L1 = V 1 + λ1
(∑
j
τjkj −
∑
j
zj
)
optimality from the perspective of the state level requires
∂L1
∂zi
= αi
∂v
∂zi
− λ1 != 0, (2)
∂L1
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ λ1
(
ki + τi(
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(sj − kj) ∂r
∂τi
+ λ1
∑
j 6=i
τj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
 != 0. (3)
Equation (2) shows that in an efficient allocation, the marginal rate of substi-
tution between private and public consumption, αi∂v/∂zi, must be equalized
across jurisdictions. Eliminating λ1 with the help of (2), condition (3) be-
comes
∂L1
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂zi
(
ki + τi(
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(sj − kj) ∂r
∂τi
+
∑
j 6=i
αj
∂v
∂zj
τj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
!
= 0. (4)
A comparison between equations (1) above and (4) shows that the last two
terms in (4) are not taken into account by the local governments. These terms
capture the fiscal externality exerted by an increase in the tax rate in locality
i on other jurisdictions. The last term, which is positive, expresses the direct
benefit from capital flowing into other jurisdictions, while the second-to-last
term is the indirect effect arising from a change in the equilibrium interest
rate.
In order to avoid unnecessary complexity in the exposition, in the sequel,
we follow Bucovetsky and Smart (2002) and restrict attention to a model
where the solution to (2) and (3) displays a uniform tax rate τi = τj =: τ .
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This implies that also capital demand is equalized across jurisdictions, ki =
kj =: k. Moreover, for simplicity, assume that in the first best situation
described by (2) and (3) the endowment with capital is equal to the demand
of capital in all jurisdictions, si = k. Then, at the ensuing equilibrium rate
of return the net supply of capital to the state is zero, s(r) = 0.
2.2 Efficient Revenue Sharing
Now, while the state government by assumption differs in its view on optimal
fiscal policies it may want to raise efficiency of local taxation. In most real
constitutions, however, the state government does not directly control taxes
and spending in local jurisdictions as in the benchmark described in (2) and
(3). One possible option to nevertheless internalize fiscal externalities consists
of imposing corrective taxes or subsidies (Wildasin, 1989). This could be
done, for instance, by setting amarginal contribution rate ϑi such that income
from grants gi is a linear function of the tax base
3
gi = yi − ϑiki.
Facing this grant scheme, the utility of a local jurisdiction is a function of
the tax rate and the two parameters determining the grant:
u2i (τi, ϑi, yi) = f (ki)− ki (r + τi) + sir + αiv (τiki + yi − ϑiki) .
Under the influence of the grant scheme, the optimal tax rate chosen by the
local jurisdiction will obey
∂u2i (τi, ϑi, yi)
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂zi
(
ki + (τi − ϑi)(∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
!
= 0. (5)
3This specification reflects the common characteristic of most redistributive transfer systems that transfers
are inversely related to the tax base or some corresponding measure of “fiscal capacity”.
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In a situation where the net capital supply is zero in all jurisdictions the
second term drops out. Rearranging yields the usual optimality condition
stating that the marginal rate of substitution between public and private
consumption equals the marginal rate of transformation, i.e. the marginal
cost of raising public funds
αi
∂v
∂zi
=
ki
ki + (τi − ϑi)(∂ki∂τi + ∂ki∂r ∂r∂τi )
.
As the contribution rate ϑi enters the denominator on the right hand side
we see that the redistributive grant system allows the state government to
adjust the marginal cost of raising public funds. From ∂ki∂τi =
∂ki
∂r < 0 and
0 > ∂r∂τi > −1 it follows that ∂ki∂τi + ∂ki∂r ∂r∂τi < 0. Hence the marginal cost of
public funds decreases if ϑi is raised. By imposing a higher ϑi, hence, the
state government can induce the local jurisdiction to increase the local tax
rate, that is, ∂τi/∂ϑi > 0.
The state government will choose ϑi and yi in order to optimize the sum
of utilities
V 2 ≡
∑
j
u2j (τj, ϑj, yj) .
In this subsection we consider a benevolent state government. It will dis-
tribute back the full amount of resources collected from the individual juris-
dictions by means of grants such that its budget constraint becomes∑
j
yj =
∑
j
ϑjkj. (6)
Formally, we set up a Lagrangian
L2 ≡ V 2 + λ2
[∑
j
ϑjkj −
∑
j
yj
]
.
Differentiation with respect to yi yields the f.o.c.
∂L2
∂yi
= αi
∂v
∂zi
− λ2 != 0, (7)
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which indicates that the state government differentiates the unconditional
grants yi among local jurisdictions such that the marginal rates of substitution
are equalized. The optimal choice of ϑi obeys
∂L2
∂ϑi
=
∂V 2
∂τi
∂τi
∂ϑi
+
∂V 2
∂ϑi
(8)
+ λ2
[
ki +
(
ϑi
∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
∂τi
∂ϑi
]
!
= 0.
Now inserting
∂V 2
∂ϑi
= −αi ∂v
∂zi
ki
and replacing λ2 by αi
∂v
∂zi
according to (7), condition (8) becomes
∂L2
∂ϑi
=
[
∂V 2
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂zi
(
ϑi
∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)]
∂τi
∂ϑi
!
= 0. (9)
In the Appendix it is shown that the condition (9) is equivalent to (4) from
the previous subsection. This confirms that a linear grant scheme can indeed
internalize the fiscal externalities induced by tax competition.
Using the symmetry of the first best solution, one can further compute
the optimal contribution rate ϑi = ϑ
∗ which, in the symmetric situation, is
also uniform across jurisdictions (see Appendix):
ϑ∗ = τ
(
1−
∂s
∂r
r
nk
∂s
∂r
r
nk −
(
n−1
n
)
∂k
∂r
r
k
)
. (10)
Here τ is the optimal local tax rate according to (4), ∂k∂r
r
k is the interest
elasticity of capital demand in a single jurisdiction evaluated at the optimal
capital stock k, and ∂s∂r
r
nk is the interest elasticity of capital supply to the
state. We can immediately see the result of Bucovetsky and Smart (2002)
that only if capital supply were completely inelastic, ∂s∂r = 0, the marginal
contribution rate is set equal to the tax rate. Otherwise, a lower contribution
rate is optimal.
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Notice that even in the symmetric situation, we allow for differences in
preferences expressed by different αi. In order to obtain an efficient decen-
tralized solution despite these, the approach of Bucovetsky and Smart (2002)
requires a complete set of individual lump-sum grants yi to each jurisdiction.
In a more general setting, where also the optimal tax rates vary across juris-
dictions, the contribution rates ϑi must also differ so as to correct incentives
specifically for each local jurisdiction.
2.3 The Role of Own State Government Objectives
The preceding analysis has dealt with the state government as a benevolent
institution which employs a grant policy where the sole objective is the effi-
ciency of local finances. However, it is not obvious, whether it is appropriate
to consider states as benevolent agencies solving inefficiencies from local ex-
ternalities. For instance, mobility, which may be an important driving force
towards efficiency, is much lower at the state as compared to the local level.
This raises the question of whether the results are robust against the inclusion
of separate state-level objectives.
Let us consider the case where the state government aims not simply at
maximizing residents’ utility. Instead, following Edwards and Keen (1996),
let the state be interested in spending some public funds e even if the residents
do not derive any utility from those expenditures. Formally, we define the
corresponding objective function as
V 3 ≡
∑
j
u2j (τj, ϑj, yj) + βw (e) ,
where the first term is, as before, the sum of residents’ utility, i.e., V 2 , and
w (e) is some increasing and strictly concave sub-utility function capturing
the valuation of expenditures e by the state government. If we take account
of the state budget constraint we see a trade-off between state spending e
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and the amount of grants allocated to the jurisdictions
e = m+
∑
j
ϑjkj −
∑
j
yj,
where m is some exogenously fixed source of revenue which is not affected by
local policies.
For the subsequent analysis, the role of unconditional grants is crucial. On
the one hand, if the state government can adjust
∑
j yj according to its de-
sires we have a rather trivial case where the state government’s expenditure
decision does not conflict with the efficiency of local finances. But, if the
state drives down the volume of funds transferred to the local jurisdictions
it will approach some limit where political cost increase as the operation of
local jurisdictions becomes difficult.4 To account for such a limitation, let us
assume for simplicity that there is some lower bound to the unconditional
grants, where the state cannot further reduce the transfers to the local ju-
risdictions. At this limit, however, the state may use its influence on the
local tax policy in order to induce local jurisdictions to raise tax revenue.
The additional revenue will then, in turn, be partly transferred to the state
budget by means of higher financing contributions of local jurisdictions in
the system of revenue sharing.
In order to discuss this in the current model, assume that the average
unconditional grant paid to the jurisdictions has to be, at least, at a level of
y′
1
n
∑
j
yj ≥ y′. (11)
In order to distinguish the issue of horizontal redistribution among munici-
palities from the role of the state’s objectives, in the following, we keep the
4This is the case in Germany where the state governments have to ensure, under constitutional law,
that their municipalities are able to accomplish their functions (e.g., Article 73 (1) of the state constitution
of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg; corresponding rules can also be found for the other states). If the state would
substantially reduce the transfers to the municipalities, they would appeal to the state court of justice
(Staatsgerichtshof). Two of the last eight decisions of the Staatsgerichtshof in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, for
example, deal with the volume of grants received by the municipalities.
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assumption of Bucovetsky and Smart (2002) that the individual grants yi are
still differentiated among local jurisdictions.
By replacing e with the net receipts of funds from the municipalities and
other, exogenous, sources of fiscal revenue m we can rewrite the state govern-
ment’s optimization problem for the case where the total amount of transfers
to the municipalities is not allowed to fall short of the amount ny′. The
Lagrangian becomes
L3 ≡ V 2 + βw
(
m+
∑
j
ϑjkj −
∑
j
yj
)
+ λ3
(∑
j
yj − ny′
)
.
The f.o.c. with respect to yi now is
∂L3
∂yi
= αi
∂v
∂zi
− β∂w
∂e
+ λ3
!
= 0. (12)
This condition can take two shapes. Firstly, the constraint (11) on the mini-
mal amount of unconditional grants may not be binding. Then λ3 = 0 and we
have αi
∂v
∂zi
= β ∂w∂e . Thus, if the state can adjust the lump sum grants without
restriction at the margin, she will do so until her own marginal benefit of funds
equals the marginal benefit of public funds for a local juristdiction. Secondly,
if the constraint on the unconditional grants binds, λ3 = β ∂w∂e −αi ∂v∂zi > 0. In
this case, the Lagrange variable measures the net benefit to the state from
transferring one unit of tax revenues from jurisdiction i to the state level, de-
termined by the difference between the marginal valuation of spending at the
state level and the marginal utility of public funds in jurisdiction i. Since we
are interested in the case where the state government provides only minimal
support for local municipalities, it is plausible to restrict attention to this
case. Notice, however, that in both cases, the marginal rates of substitution
αi
∂v
∂zi
are equalized among the local jurisdictions by means of unconditional
grants yi.
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With regard to the contribution rate the optimality condition is
∂L3
∂ϑi
=
{
∂V 2
∂τi
+ β
∂w
∂e
(
ϑi
∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)}
∂τi
∂ϑi
(13)
+
(
β
∂w
∂e
− αi ∂v
∂zi
)
ki
!
= 0.
In order to assess the impact of the state’s own objective on her choice of
grant scheme, we start by considering the contribution rate of the first best
solution (9). We then use (13) to evaluate in which direction the state would
like to adjust this rate as soon as she takes the new, selfish objective into
account.5 To do so, we compare equation (13) with the benchmark (9), and
note that the difference between the optimality conditions is
∂L3
∂ϑi
− ∂L
2
∂ϑi
=
(
β
∂w
∂e
− αi ∂v
∂zi
)[
ki +
(
ϑi
∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
∂τi
∂ϑi
]
.
The sign of this expression depends first of all on the term β ∂w∂e − αi ∂v∂zi . In
the case of a binding constraint (11), this is positive, i.e. the state at least
wants to extract further resources from the local jurisdictions.
Whether or not the state government is able to extract resources from
the local revenue sharing system by inducing higher local taxes depends,
however, also on the sign of the second term. This term expresses by how
much the aggregate receipts from revenue sharing
∑
j ϑjkj collected by the
state changes if the contribution rate for state i is increased. If this term
is positive, the state will indeed raise more revenue by increasing ϑi. This
expression may be negative, however. A decrease in the contribution rate
might raise revenue because it might cause, via the associated fall in the tax
rate τi and the corresponding rise in the net interest rate r, a strong inflow of
capital to the state as a whole. This might then outweigh the direct effect of
5Since in this paper, our aim is to highlight the incentives introduced by own state objectives, we restrict
attention to a local analysis of the first order conditions around the first best, or to comparative statics
around a local optimum. A global analysis would be much more involved while being very unlikely to
produce additional economic insights.
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taking less money away from jurisdiction i. To see under which circumstances
the positive effect prevails, notice that from the capital market equilibrium
and making use of the symmetry, ϑi = ϑj, we can rewrite the difference in
the optimality conditions as
∂L3
∂ϑi
− ∂L
2
∂ϑi
=
(
β
∂w
∂e
− αi ∂v
∂zi
)[
ki + ϑi
(
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
∂τi
∂ϑi
]
.
In this expression, the term in squared brackets is positive if ∂s/∂r is small.
Intuitively, in the extreme case where the state is (almost) a closed economy,
the total amount of capital is (almost) fixed, and thus total revenue can only
rise if a contribution rate is increased. Therefore, if the capital supply is not
too elastic the state government gains from an increased ϑi and induces a
higher local tax rate than in the benchmark case (9).
We can summarize these findings by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Distortion by State Government Objectives)
If the state government values own funds more than the funds for local juris-
dictions such that it expropriates funds from the local revenue sharing system,
and if the supply of capital is sufficiently inelastic, a marginal increase of the
local tax rate above the first best, induced by the local revenue sharing system,
is beneficial for the state government.
Proposition 1 says that a (partly) selfish state government uses her local
revenue sharing system in order to induce higher local tax rates. This result
can easily be applied to understand why such revenue sharing systems may
lead to excessive equalization in the sense that a local jurisdiction has to pay
more than 100% of additional tax revenue into the revenue sharing system. To
see this, consider the case where capital supply is completely inelastic, ∂s∂r = 0,
so that Proposition 1 applies. In this case, the first best contribution rate is
ϑ∗ = τ , as can be seen from (10). Hence, already in the first best, the grant
system entirely takes away any increase in local tax revenue induced by an
increasing tax base. Adding now a selfish motive for the state government,
there is an incentive to raise the contribution still further. Thus, as the
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following Corollary implies, an increase in a jurisdiction’s tax base actually
reduces her revenues after equalization.
Corollary 1 (Excessive Equalization)
If the state government values own funds more than the funds for local juris-
dictions such that it expropriates funds from the local revenue sharing system,
and if the supply of capital is completely inelastic, then increasing the con-
tribution rate above the local tax rate is beneficial for the state government.
Given that the state government extracts funds it is useful to consider
as a simple comparative static exercise a variation in exogenous resources
received by the state. As a reduction in m forces the state to cut spending, it
contributes to an increase in the marginal benefit of state spending. Hence,
we should expect that the state induces jurisdictions to set higher tax rates.
To see that this is the case, let us reformulate optimality condition (13);
given the symmetry and taking account of the capital market equilibrium we
obtain
∂L3
∂ϑi
=
{
∂V 2
∂τi
+ β
∂w
∂e
ϑi
[
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
]}
∂τi
∂ϑi
+
(
β
∂w
∂e
− αi ∂v
∂zi
)
ki
!
= 0.
Rearranging yields
∂L3
∂ϑi
=
∂V 2
∂τi
∂τi
∂ϑi
+ β
∂w
∂e
[
ki + ϑi
(
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
∂τi
∂ϑi
]
− αi ∂v
∂zi
ki
!
= 0.(14)
Recall from above that, with a low elasticity of capital supply, the second
term will be positive. Then, it is obvious that with an increase in β ∂w∂e the
second term rises. In order to restore optimality, the remaining parts of ∂L
3
∂ϑi
have to decrease which, around a local maximum, requires an increase in ϑi.
That in turn implies that the state induces local jurisdictions to raise their
tax rate:
Proposition 2 (Impact of State Level Revenue)
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, if the state government experiences a
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reduction in revenue m independent of local jurisdictions’ policies, a marginal
increase of the local tax rate, induced by the local revenue sharing system, is
beneficial for the state government.
2.4 Disincentive Effect of Fiscal Equalization at State
Level
Besides of own objectives of state governments the efficiency orientation of
states is particularly doubtful in the German situation, where the states are
subject to a large degree of fiscal redistribution among states: They have
to share a substantial amount of local tax revenue, say ξk, with the other
states and the federal government. Thus, even if states are simply benevolent,
the transfer obligation will alter the marginal cost of providing local public
services and, hence, will affect efficient revenue sharing.
In order to analyze this case, we have to modify the above budget con-
straint (6) by the amount of transfers to other states ξ
∑
j kj. Formally, we
set up a Lagrangian
L4 ≡ V 2 + λ4
[∑
j
(ϑj − ξ) kj −
∑
j
yj
]
.
Differentiation with respect to yi again yields the f.o.c. (7), λ
4 = αi
∂v
∂zi
. Using
this in the f.o.c. with respect to the contribution rates, we have
∂L4
∂ϑi
=
∂L2
∂ϑi
− αi ∂v
∂zi
[
ξ
∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ξ
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
]
∂τi
∂ϑi
!
= 0.
Taking once more account of the capital market equilibrium we can simplify
this expression to
∂L4
∂ϑi
=
∂L2
∂ϑi
− ξαi ∂v
∂zi
[
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
]
∂τi
∂ϑi
!
= 0. (15)
The additional term captures the consequences of revenue sharing on tax
policy: if a higher tax rate at i reduces capital supply, also the transfers to
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the state level fiscal equalization system are reduced. Consequently, this last
term is positive, indicating that the contribution rate ϑi is increased against
the case where ξ = 0. However, if capital supply is inelastic (∂s∂r = 0), the
last term vanishes. In this case the spending obligation is financed solely by
a uniform reduction of grants without altering the contribution rates.
Of course, as above we could introduce the assumption that the state
government extracts resources from the jurisdictions by means of the local
revenue sharing system as there is a minimal mandatory endowment of juris-
dictions with unconditional grants (11). In this case, the additional transfer
obligations at the level of states would reduce the amount of state spending
e = m+
∑
j
ϑjkj −
∑
j
yj − ξ
∑
j
kj.
Inserting this expression into the extended objective function we obtain
L5 ≡ V 2 + βw
(
m+
∑
j
(ϑj − ξ) kj −
∑
j
yj
)
+ λ5
(∑
j
yj − ny′
)
.
The optimality condition for yi replicates (12). The condition for ϑi now
reads
∂L5
∂ϑi
=
∂L3
∂ϑi
− ξβ∂w
∂e
[
∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
]
∂τi
∂ϑi
!
= 0. (16)
Simplification using the capital market equilibrium condition yields
∂L5
∂ϑi
=
∂L3
∂ϑi
− ξβ∂w
∂e
[
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
]
∂τi
∂ϑi
!
= 0. (17)
While the first term is equivalent to the case of own state government objec-
tives, the second term captures the impact of the fiscal equalization system
between federal and state governments. Note that this term is positive: it
reflects the fact that a tax rate increase lowers the tax base in the state and,
therefore, reduces transfer obligations out of the state budget. This exerts
an incentive towards a higher contribution rate and higher taxes.
Together, the last two results can be summarized as follows:
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Proposition 3 (Distortion by State Level Fiscal Equalization)
If the state government has to contribute to a redistributive system of intergov-
ernmental transfers some part of the revenue raised at the local level, ξ
∑
j kj,
and if the supply of capital is not completely inelastic, then a marginal in-
crease of the local tax rate, induced by the local revenue sharing system, is
beneficial for the state government, regardless of whether it is benevolent or
expropriating funds for wasteful purposes.
3 Empirical Analysis
The above propositions seem to be of particular relevance in the case of
the German federation. While local municipalities make use of a local busi-
ness tax and, consequently, are involved with tax competition, each state
redistributes revenue substantially by means of a local fiscal revenue shar-
ing system. Previous research has shown that the redistribution causes local
municipalities to set rather high tax rates (Buettner, 2005). However, while
the systems of local revenue sharing are broadly similar across states, there
are differences in institutional details which make it very difficult to come up
with key parameters such as the level of grants and the marginal contribution
rates for all states. Therefore, the empirical analysis is concerned with the
implications of a state influence on local revenue sharing for the local business
tax rate.
3.1 State and Local Finances in Germany
In order to identify a state influence on local tax policy we need to find some
variation in the conditions faced specifically by state governments but not by
local jurisdictions. Moreover, it is important that this variation is not affected
or, statistically, correlated with the local jurisdictions taxing decisions. A first
variable which comes to mind is the level of the debt burden. As the level of
debt is inherited from past policy it seems useful to consider a state’s debt
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burden as an indicator of the availability of fiscal resources in the sense of
Proposition 2. However, there are two obvious problems with this approach.
The first relates to a potential correlation between state and local finances. If
there is some common source of shocks driving deficits both at state and local
level, the empirical correlation with state level debt might be misleading. In
order to overcome this problem we will include debt-variables for both state
and local debt. This allows us to consider the impact of state debt conditional
on the local debt burden. A second problem arises from the role of the capital
market in the determination of the interest rate. If tax policies are taken into
account by the capital market it seems generally possible that certain tax
policies are reflected in the interest rate or the market value of the debt.
However, as the federal government is forced by the constitution to provide
a backing for state finances this effect is likely to be negligible.6
Another promising source for variation in conditions faced by state gov-
ernments is the system of fiscal equalization at the state level which exerts
important incentives for state government policies. Depending on the fiscal
capacity relative to what is considered as “fiscal need” the system of fiscal
equalization allocates funds such that states with low capacity receive trans-
fers while those with high capacity will actually contribute to the system. A
change in the grants received implies a shift in the state-government budget
constraint which will according to Proposition 2 result in different local tax
rates provided the state government pursues own policies and has already
lowered unconditional grants to municipalities. A second potentially impor-
tant variable derived from the state-level equalization system is the marginal
contribution rate. This is the rate at which an increase in the state-wide
business tax base is actually reducing the net transfers received within the
state-level fiscal revenue sharing system. As explained above (see Proposition
3), given a higher marginal contribution rate the state might want to induce
6Seitz (1999) describes how supreme court decisions on the federal support have prevented the rating of
state bonds to deteriorate relative to the federal level.
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local jurisdictions to increase taxing effort. A significant positive coefficient of
this variable will actually provide evidence on the pure (dis-)incentive effect
of state level fiscal equalization on the state’s operation of the local finances.
With this approach, the empirical analysis is related to Baretti et al. (2002)
who find some support for the hypothesis that intergovernmental relations at
the state level exert adverse disincentive effects on a state’s revenue collec-
tion. In contrast, our analysis is concerned with the incentive effects on local
taxation which originate in the state’s role to enforce revenue sharing among
local jurisdictions.
As is discussed in more detail in Buettner (2005) in the context of mu-
nicipalities, the fact that equalization grants and marginal contribution rate
are determined by a complicated, non-linear, albeit clearly defined system of
fiscal equalization, allows us to pursue an identification strategy along the
lines of regression discontinuity estimation (e.g., Van der Klauw, 2002, and
Angrist and Lavy, 1999). Since, if we control for the potential influence of fis-
cal capacity in the estimation, we can separate out the differential treatment
of the states.
3.2 Data
To study the German case, we have collected an annual database for German
States in the period between 1970 and 2003. Since data are only available
from 1991 onwards, the new states in former East Germany are excluded.
Furthermore, we exclude the three so called city states of Hamburg, Bremen,
and Berlin since there is no clear distinction between state and local level.
The database contains information about the average tax rate for the local
business tax in each of the states and corresponding revenue data as well as
net interest expenses. In addition, the database contains detailed information
about the treatment of each state in the state-level equalization system. More
specifically, the database allows us to compute for each state and each year all
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Dev.
Collection rate (in %) 352.3 37.57 254.0 431.6
State debt service (e per capita) 143.0 10.77 1.386 495.6
Municipal debt service (e per capita) 48.19 23.11 1.340 94.13
Population (in 1000) 7372 4992 1043 18073
State (net-)equalization revenue (e per capita) -17.24 107.2 -474.7 196.0
State marginal contribution rate (in %) 42.97 13.94 8.139 72.01
Rel. fiscal capacity 1.861 .2785 .8901 2.460
Stand. business tax base (e per capita) 64.77 21.57 20.87 122.6
State parliament election year .2463 .4316 0 1
Municipal council election year .2022 .4001 0 1
Annual data for 8 German States in the period 1970-2003
contributions and transfers related to fiscal equalization at the state level (see
Appendix). Some further control variables are used to capture the population
size, the lagged tax base, and election years both at local and state level. The
latter will control for political business cycle effects which have been found to
be important at the local level (e.g., Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli, 2002).
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics.
The local tax rate is depicted by the collection rate (“Hebesatz”), which
is an unknown concept for readers not acquainted with the German case.
However, it is rather simple: the tax law sets a base rate of 5% and requires
each local jurisdiction to set its collection rate. For instance, the collection
rate might be a figure of 380%, which means that the statutory tax rate
applied to the firm is 3.8× 0.05 = 19%.
The collection rate displays substantial variation across time and states.
Note that level and variation of debt service are much larger at the state as
compared to the local level. State net-equalization revenue varies strongly
between positive and negative figures indicating that some states receive pos-
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itive transfers while others are net contributors. Note that the marginal con-
tribution rate is above 40 % at the mean, indicating that on average a state
has to transfer an amount of more than 40 cents out of each Euro of addi-
tional tax revenue. A problem with this variable is, however, that it shows
not only a high degree of variation across states but also strong fluctuations
in time.
3.3 Results
Table 2 provides results from alternative specifications. In order to control
for the heterogeneity of states, state fixed effects are included. Since the tax
policy will need some time to adjust the lag of the tax rate is included. We also
control for the tax base, but since the current tax base is co-determined by
the current tax rate, only the lag of the tax base is employed. Specification
(1) uses a basic set of explanatory variables, specification (2) additionally
employs some cubic trend-polynomial in order to test for the importance of
common trends. Specification (3) to (5) test for an impact of the state-level
fiscal equalization system including also terms capturing the differences in
fiscal capacity.
The strong effect of the lagged collection rate supports a standard partial
adjustment process. With regard to elections the political business cycle
hypothesis is confirmed in the sense that current municipal council elections
do exert the expected negative effect. Elections for the state government are
not found to exert an impact on taxation. With regard to the debt service,
we find not only that the municipal debt service exerts a significant impact
on the local tax rate but also that the burden of debt service at state-level
proves significant across all specifications. In the light of Propositions 1 and 2
this supports the view that the availability of fiscal resources at the state level
exerts an impact on the tax policy of local jurisdictions. While we cannot say
whether this effect is the consequence of changes in the local revenue sharing
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system as the above theory suggests, this result raises doubts whether the
state government should really be considered as pursuing policies only in the
interest of municipalities.
With regard to incentives generated by the state-level fiscal equalization
system note that the specifications test for the effects conditional on (rela-
tive) fiscal capacity. This is important in order to make sure that the results
capture the impact of fiscal equalization rather than simply reflecting differ-
ences in the taxing capacity. In order to make sure that also no non-linear
differences in the fiscal capacity are driving the result, specifications (4) and
(5) employ quadratic and cubic specifications, respectively. The results sup-
port an impact of the volume of transfers received. Since net-revenue from
equalization may be negative it is entered in per-capita terms. In order to
compare the magnitude of the estimate with that of an increase in the state’s
debt burden we have to evaluate the semi-elasticity obtained for the debt
burden at the mean. Using the figure of 143 e per capita as depicted in Ta-
ble 1, we obtain an average marginal effect of the state debt service of about
.028 which has a similar magnitude in absolute terms as the effect of the
net-equalization revenue. Thus, the point estimates imply that an increase
in state revenue or a decline in the debt burden of about 100 e per capita
leads to a reduction in the collection rate by 2.5 or 2.8 percentage points,
i.e. 0.13 to 0.14 percentage points in the statutory tax rate in the short run,
or about 1.2 to 1.3 percentage points in the long run.7 The marginal con-
tribution rate, which determines to what extent net-transfers received shrink
given an increase in business tax revenue, shows no significant effect. This
variable, however, shows rather strong fluctuations since the system of fiscal
equalization not only responds in a non-linear fashion to the fiscal capacity
of the considered state but also in a non-linear way on the fiscal capacity of
the other states. This makes it very hard to identify incentive effect of fiscal
7The latter calculation takes account of an estimate for the coefficient of the lag of the collection rate of
about 0.89.
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equalization at the state level.
Taken together we can state that the empirical analysis provides partial
confirmation of the above theoretical predictions.8 The results obtained for
the states’ debt service and the states’ transfer revenues suggest that the
position of the state government’s budget line has a significant effect on the
level of taxation chosen by the local governments in a state: a decline in
available fiscal resources at the state level causes an increase in local tax
rates. Broadly seen, this is in line with Proposition 2, which provides the
argument that the government assigns some value to its own funds such that
it extracts fiscal resources from the local governments. By contrast, the third
prediction, from Proposition 3, is not confirmed. However, as we have just
argued it seems likely that this failure is related to the statistical properties
of the state-level fiscal equalization system.
4 Conclusions
The recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may
tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax competition (Bucov-
etsky and Smart, 2002, Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2002), at least to some extent. While
the existence of redistributive grant systems might explain why local govern-
ments make use of distortive taxes despite of tax competition (Smart, 1998,
Buettner, 2005), it is difficult to derive policy recommendations. The reason
is that the welfare implications from tax competition and tax coordination
strongly depend on the government objectives.
Given this background the current paper has explored the conditions under
which redistributive grant systems will or will not achieve efficiency in local
finances. We have considered a standard model of tax competition of local
8Similar results have been obtained for Canadian provinces. Esteller-More´ and Sole´-Olle´ (2002) find that
provinces which receive equalization grants set higher personal income tax rates if the contribution rate
to the equalization system is increased. Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2005) show that an increase in the
volume of federal grants received induces provinces to reduce their corporate income tax rates.
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jurisdictions and introduced a system of redistributive grants executed at
the state level. The basic model has then been extended in order to allow
for variations in the government objectives at the state level. The theoretical
results suggest that similar to the literature on vertical tax competition (Keen
and Kotsogiannis, 2003, Wrede, 1998) attempts of upper level governments
to extract fiscal resources from the local revenue sharing system will tend to
undermine efficiency of local finances, and, possibly, even result in excessive
equalization.
These concerns are corroborated by the empirical analysis of tax policy in
Germany. The results from our empirical analysis of tax policy in Germany
suggest that attempts of state governments to extract fiscal resources from
the municipal revenue sharing system exert an upward pressure on tax rates.
While we cannot say whether this effect is the consequence of changes in
the local revenue sharing system as the above theory suggests, this result
raises doubts whether the state government should really be considered as
pursuing policies only in the interest of municipalities. The results of the
paper support concerns that the potential benefits from local revenue sharing
cannot be reaped if the state, as the institution enforcing the revenue sharing
system at the local level, pursues own policies and operates under conditions
which cause inefficiencies at the state level.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Equivalence of (4) and (9). Since ∂τi∂ϑi 6= 0, the expression in brackets in
(9) must be zero in an optimum. Computing
∂V 2
∂τi
= −ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ αi
∂v
∂zi
(
ki + (τi − ϑi) (∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(sj − kj) ∂r
∂τi
+
∑
j 6=i
αj
∂v
∂zj
(τj − ϑj) ∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi

and using αi
∂v
∂zi
= αj
∂v
∂zj
= λ2 for all i, j, condition (9) is so equivalent to
− ki + (si − ki) ∂r
∂τi
+ λ2
(
ki + (τi − ϑi) (∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
)
(A.1)
+
∑
j 6=i
(sj − kj) ∂r
∂τi
+ λ2
∑
j 6=i
(τj − ϑj) ∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
+ λ2
(
ϑi
∂ki
∂τi
+
∑
j
ϑj
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
!
= 0
Close inspection of (A.1) reveals that the terms involving the contribution
rates ϑi and ϑj cancel out. Hence, since from (7), λ
2 = αi
∂v
∂zi
= αj
∂v
∂zj
for all
i, j, we are back with the first best optimality condition (4).
Calculation of the optimal contribution rate. Inserting the opti-
mality condition from the perspective of the individual jurisdiction (5) in
(4), using sj = kj for all j, dividing by αi
∂v
∂zi
= αj
∂v
∂zj
> 0, and observing that
in the symmetric situation, τj = τ for all j, we obtain
ϑi
(
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
)
= −τ
∑
j 6=i
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
.
Differentiating the capital market equilibrium condition with respect to τi,
one finds
∂ki
∂τi
+
∂ki
∂r
∂r
∂τi
=
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
−
∑
j 6=i
∂kj
∂r
∂r
∂τi
.
Thus,
ϑi = τ
(
1−
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
∂s
∂r
∂r
∂τi
− ∑j 6=i ∂kj∂r ∂r∂τi
)
.
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Notice that in the symmetric situation,
∂kj
∂r is identical for all jurisdictions j,
say ∂k∂r . Then, dividing the numerator and the denominator of the fraction in
the bracket by ∂r∂τi 6= 0 and multiplying both by rnk yields ϑi = ϑ∗ as in (10).
Appendix B: Data Sources and Definitions
The basic dataset consists of annual data for Germany in the period 1970 until
2003. The population and GDP data are obtained from the federal statistical
office (Statistisches Bundesamt). The same applies to the average collection
rates, the standardized business tax revenues (Gewerbesteuergrundbetrag) as
well as the data on debt service. Business tax revenue sharing contributions
(Gewerbesteuerumlagesa¨tze) are obtained from the federal ministry of finance
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen).
Average collection rates of the business tax (Gewerbesteuer) are aver-
ages of the municipalities’ collection rates (Hebesa¨tze) for the years (Rech-
nungsjahre) 1970-2003 weighted by the tax base.
State net-equalization revenue and marginal contribution rates
and relative fiscal capacity are obtained from a full implementation of
the fiscal equalization law and further relevant statutory definitions for each
year in the period 1970-2003 (a description of the system is given in Ap-
pendix C). Federal fiscal equalization rules (Finanzausgleichsgesetz - FAG)
are obtained from the Bundesgesetzblatt. Data for calculating fiscal ca-
pacity (Finanzkraftmesszahl) and fiscal need (Ausgleichsmesszahl) are taken
from the annual enactments to implement the fiscal equalization law (Zweite
Verordnung zur Durchfu¨hrung des Gesetzes u¨ber den Finanzausgleich zwis-
chen Bund und La¨ndern in den Ausgleichsjahren 1970 - 2002). These enact-
ments are also obtained from the Bundesgesetzblatt. Relative fiscal capacity
is defined as the ratio of fiscal capacity to fiscal need.
Debt service is defined as annual interest expenses net of interest income.
Election years for state and local elections are obtained from the Friedrich-
Naumann Stiftung (Archiv des Liberalismus).
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Appendix C: State-Level Fiscal Equalization in Ger-
many
In order to capture the incentive effects of the state-level fiscal equalization
system (SFES) in Germany, we employ a simulation program to calculate
transfers received as well as marginal contribution rates. The full implemen-
tation of the fiscal equalization rules into the simulation program enables
us to compute various parameters of the SFES. The calculations are based
on population and tax data for the German states (“Bundesla¨nder”). The
following briefly describes the system in its current state (2004).
The treatment of a state within the system depends on the ratio of its fiscal
capacity (“Finanzkraftmesszahl”) and its fiscal needs (“Ausgleichsmesszahl”).
We will refer to this ratio as the relative fiscal capacity. A state’s fiscal ca-
pacity ti is determined by the sum of its tax revenues from different types of
taxes.9 Fiscal needs ni are calculated by multiplying the average per capita
tax revenues in the federation by the state’s population. Formally
ni =
∑
j tj
P
pi,
where P represents the overall population while pi denotes the population in
state i. States with fiscal capacity below fiscal needs receive transfers, while
states with a fiscal capacity exceeding fiscal need contribute to the system.
The German SFES contains three different stages:
• VAT Equalization (“Umsatzsteuervorwegausgleich”)
• State Fiscal Equalization (“Finanzausgleich i.e.S.”)
• Federal Grants (“Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen”)
VAT Equalization In the first stage of the SFES up to 25% of the overall
VAT revenues are used to compensate fiscal capacity differences between
the German states. States with a relative fiscal capacity below one receive
9In the SFES the following main types of taxes are taken into account: income tax, corporate income
tax, VAT and excise and sales taxes, and a fraction of the municipal taxes.
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transfers
zi1 = γ1(
ti1
ni1
)ni1 ,
where the transfer rate in stage one of the SFES, γ1, represents a function of
the state‘s relative fiscal capacity.10 To see how a marginal increase in the
tax revenues in state i affects the transfers received in stage one, note that
∂zi1
∂ti1
= γ′1
[
ni1 − piP ti1
ni1
]
+ γ1
pi
P
= γ′1
[
1− ti1∑
j tj1
]
+ γ1
pi
P
< 0.
The first term captures the effect of a decreasing transfer rate on zi1. As
γ′1 < 0, since an increase in fiscal capacity lowers the transfer rate, this term
is negative. Taking into account that an increase in the fiscal capacity of state
i will also have a positive impact on its fiscal need, the second summand is
positive. The overall effect for a low capacity state, i.e. a state which is
characterized by a relative fiscal capacity below one, is negative indicating
that an increase in tax revenues will reduce the amount of transfers the state
receives within the SFES.
On the other hand, also high fiscal capacity states will be affected by stage
one. A marginal increase in the tax revenues will not only raise fiscal capacity
in this state but will also raise fiscal need in state i as well as in all other
states. Low capacity states will then receive additional transfers within VAT
Equalization, which are financed out of the overall VAT revenue. Therefore
the high capacity state i will have to contribute the additional amount
∂ci1
∂ti1
> 0
to the SFES. Here ci1 denotes the contribution rate for a high capacity state
within VAT Equalization.
Fiscal Equalization In the second stage of the SFES fiscal capacity differ-
ences which remain after VAT Equalization are further reduced. As in stage
one, low capacity states receive transfers
zi2 = γ2(
ti2
ni2
)ni2
10Note that in the VAT Equalization stage only the state revenues are taken into account. In stage two and
three fiscal capacity will also include a fraction of the municipal tax revenues as well as the VAT revenues.
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depending on their relative fiscal capacity. The only difference is that now
also VAT revenues as well as revenues from municipal taxes are taken into
account for calculating ti2 and ni2. The effect of an increase in fiscal capacity
∂zi2
∂ti2
is equivalent to stage one.
In the Fiscal Equalization stage high fiscal capacity states, i.e. states
which are characterized by a relative fiscal capacity above one, contribute
the amount
ci2 = δ2(
ti2
ni2
)ni2.
The contribution rate δ2 represents a function of the relative fiscal capacity
in state i. Then the marginal effect of an increase in the fiscal capacity in
state i reads
∂ci2
∂ti2
=
[
1− ti2∑
j tj2
]
δ′2 + δ2
pi
P
> 0.
Note that the δ′2 > 0 indicating that an increase in fiscal capacity will lead to a
higher contribution rate. Again we can distinguish two different effects. The
effect due to an increased contribution rate as well as an effect which arises
from the fact, that an increase in the fiscal capacity in state i will increase
fiscal need in all states. Both effects are positive leading to an overall increase
in state i‘s contributions to the SFES.
Federal grants If a state‘s relative fiscal capacity lies below 0.995 after
the stages one and two it will in addition receive transfers from the federal
level, formally
zi3 = 0.775 [0.995ni3 − ti3] = 0.771ni3 − 0.775ti3.
Differentiating with respect to fiscal capacity in state i yields
∂zi3
∂ti3
= 0.771
pi
P
− 0.775 < 0.
As this partial derivative is negative an increase in the fiscal capacity of a low
capacity state i will lead to a decrease in grants from the federal government.
Marginal Contribution Rates for the SFES The marginal contribution
rates for the different stages of the SFES were calculated as follows.
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For low capacity states
ϑi1 = |∂zi1
∂ti1
|, ϑi2 = |∂zi2
∂ti2
|, ϑi3 = |∂zi3
∂ti3
|.
For high capacity states
ϑi1 =
∂ci1
∂ti1
, ϑi2 =
∂ci2
∂ti2
.
By adding the marginal contribution rates from the different SFES stages
one receives the overall marginal effect of an increase in a state’s tax revenues.
For practical reasons the simulations assume a tax increase by one percent.
Then, for example, the mean marginal contribution rate of 43% indicates
that only 57 cent of the additional taxes remain in the state budget due to
increased contributions or reduced transfers within the SFES.
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